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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I argue that the zombie conceivability argument, as developed by 
David Chalmers, is unsound. My primary contribution in the paper is a critique of the 
claim that zombies are positively conceivable. I argue that phenomenal experience (that 
which zombies purportedly lack) is not something we can imagine; it is only something 
we can have. We can only imagine the contents of experience, and in doing so we have a 
new phenomenal experience of the imagined contents. Without being able to imagine 
phenomenal experience we have no way to determine whether a creature we imagine has 
or lacks phenomenal experience. Therefore, we have no justification for claiming that 
zombies are positively conceivable. Chalmers also argues, however, that the negative 
conceivability of zombies is sufficient for his argument. In response to this claim, I defer 
to an argument given by Keith Frankish that invokes the notion of anti-zombies (creatures 
that are physically identical to us, with no non-physical properties, and yet have 
phenomenal experience). Frankish argues that a parallel argument can be given that goes 
from the conceivability of an anti-zombie, to the possibility of an anti-zombie, to the truth 
of materialism. I argue that, without the positive conceivability of zombies, there is no 
reason to think that zombies (rather than anti-zombies) are negatively conceivable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I will argue that the zombie conceivability argument, as developed 
by David Chalmers, is unsound.  Chalmers’ argument can be roughly summarized as 
follows: P1) If orthodox materialism is true, then zombies (i.e., creatures that are 
physically identical to us yet lack phenomenal experience) are not metaphysically 
possible; P2) If zombies are either positively conceivable (i.e., can be clearly and 
distinctly imagined) or negatively conceivable (i.e., cannot be ruled out a priori), then 
zombies are metaphysically possible; P3) Zombies are positively conceivable and 
negatively conceivable; C) Orthodox materialism is false.1 
My primary contribution in this paper will be a critique of the claim that zombies 
are positively conceivable.  I will argue that phenomenal experience (that which zombies 
purportedly lack) is not something we can imagine; it is only something we can have. We 
can only imagine the contents of experience, and in doing so we have a new phenomenal 
experience of the imagined contents.  My position does not entail that it is impossible (or 
even difficult) to attend directly to phenomenal experience itself, but only that we cannot 
do so by imagining it.  Without being able to imagine phenomenal experience we have no 
way of knowing whether a creature we imagine has or lacks phenomenal experience. 
Therefore, we have no justification for claiming that zombies are positively conceivable. 
                                                
1 See Chalmers 2005. 
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Regarding the negative conceivability of zombies, I will defer to an argument 
given by Keith Frankish that invokes the notion of anti-zombies (creatures that are 
physically identical to us, with no non-physical properties, and yet have phenomenal 
experience). Frankish argues that one can use the same method employed in the zombie 
argument and run a parallel argument that goes from the conceivability of an anti-zombie, 
to the possibility of an anti-zombie, to the truth of materialism. I will argue that, without 
the positive conceivability of zombies, we have no reason to think that zombies (rather 
than anti-zombies) are negatively conceivable.  
Before moving into the details of my critique, it will be beneficial to examine how 
Chalmers frames his argument.  First, I will summarize four notions of supervenience.  
Second, I will look at how these notions can be used to formalize the commitments of 
materialism. Third, I will summarize Chalmers’ use of “conceivability” and how he 
thinks it can be used as a guide to metaphysical possibility.  Fourth, I will move to 
examine the specific types of conceivability that Chalmers believes apply to zombies and 
why he thinks these types of conceivability are sufficient to raise problems for 
materialism.  Finally, in sections V through VIII, I will respond to Chalmers by arguing 
that we have no basis for claiming that zombies are positively or negatively conceivable. 
 
I: Four Types of Supervenience 
To begin, consider how the notion of supervenience relates to the doctrine of materialism. 
Supervenience can be broadly defined as follows: B supervenes on A if no two 
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circumstances are identical with respect to A and different with respect to B.  Four 
notions of supervenience are relevant: local, global, metaphysical, and nomological. 
The first two (local/global) indicate whether the supervenience relation in 
question concerns particular entities or whole worlds. Local supervenience is concerned 
with the supervenience relations between properties possessed by particular entities. We 
can say that B locally supervenes on A if no two particular entities are identical with 
respect to A and different with respect to B. Chalmers gives the example of shape and 
physical properties. Shape locally supervenes on physical properties because any two 
specific entities that are identical with respect to physical properties will also be identical 
with respect to shape. This is not true, however, of context-dependent properties, such as 
value.2 A counterfeit coin and genuine coin may be identical with respect to their 
physical properties, but they will not have the same value.  This is not to say that value 
fails to supervene on the totality of physical facts. It is only to say that two particular 
entities that are physically identical are not always of the same value. 
Global supervenience, on the other hand, is concerned with the supervenience 
relations between all properties instantiated in entire possible worlds.  We can say that B 
globally supervenes on A if no two possible worlds are identical with respect to A and 
different with respect to B. 
If two sets of properties are related by local supervenience, they will also be 
related by global supervenience.  That is, if it is true that any two particular entities 
identical with respect to A are identical with respect to B, then it will also be true that any 
                                                
2 Chalmers 1996, p. 34. 
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two possible worlds that are identical with respect to A are identical with respect to B.  It 
does not work the other way around.  Chalmers asks us to consider the example of 
biological and physical properties.  He argues that it is likely that any world that is 
identical to ours with respect to physical properties will also be identical to ours with 
respect to biological properties.  Thus, biological properties globally supervene on the 
physical properties.  However, due to environmental factors, two organisms identical 
with respect to their physical properties may still be biologically distinct (perhaps with 
different evolutionary histories).3  Therefore, not all biological properties locally 
supervene on the physical properties. 
The second two notions of supervenience (metaphysical/nomological) specify 
what is meant by a possible circumstance. B metaphysically supervenes on A if no two 
circumstances that are metaphysically possible are identical with respect to A and 
different with respect to B.   
Nomological supervenience, on the other hand, concerns what is possible within 
our laws of nature. B nomologically supervenes on A if no two circumstances that could 
occur within our laws of nature are identical with respect to A and different with respect 
to B.  Consider the difference between a cubic mile of gold and a cubic mile of uranium-
235. Both of these are metaphysically possible.  But given the laws of nature, as we 
understand them, a cubic mile of uranium-235 is not possible in our world. 
The distinction between metaphysical and nomological supervenience can be seen 
to parallel the distinction between local and global supervenience. Just as local 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
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supervenience entails global supervenience (but not vice versa), so too does metaphysical 
supervenience entail nomological supervenience (but not vice versa).  Suppose, for 
example, that B metaphysically supervenes on A; that is, no two circumstances that are 
metaphysically possible are identical with respect to A and different with respect to B.  
Then it will also be true that B nomologically supervenes on A.  The reason is that if 
something is not metaphysically possible, then it will not be something that could occur 
within our framework of natural laws.  But it does not work the other way around.  Two 
sets of properties that always coexist within our laws of nature might not coexist in every 
metaphysically possible world. 
Chalmers uses Saul Kripke’s image of God creating the world to further clarify 
this distinction between metaphysical and nomological supervenience.  If B 
metaphysically supervenes on A, then when God created the A-properties nothing more 
needed to be done to ensure that there would also be B-properties. If, on the other hand, B 
only nomologically supervenes on A, then after God created the A-properties there was 
still more work to do to ensure that the B-properties would always coexist with the A-
properties in our world.4 
 
II. Materialism’s Commitments 
With these types of supervenience in mind (local, global, metaphysical, and 
nomological), let us now consider the doctrine of materialism. Materialism claims that 
everything in our world is physical, that all the positive facts pertaining to our world are 
                                                
4 Ibid., p. 38. 
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physical facts.  In terms of the creation analogy, once the physical properties of our world 
were created everything in our world was created; no further work needed to be done.  
God simply established the physical facts about our world, and in doing so all the facts 
about our world were established.  So, materialism is committed to the claim that all the 
facts about our world metaphysically supervene on the physical facts. 
A qualification needs to be given, however.  Some may think that there are 
possible worlds that are physically identical to ours but have extra non-physical objects 
(e.g., tree gods), which are not found in our world. If this is the case, then there will be 
certain negative facts about our world (e.g., tree gods do not exist) that will not hold in 
every world that is physically identical to ours.  But this raises no problem for 
materialism. Only worlds where the same negative facts obtain are pertinent to 
materialism’s commitments. Precisely, materialism is committed to the claim that all the 
facts about our world hold in every physically identical world, so long as the negative 
facts obtaining in our world also obtain in this world. So from here on out, when I refer to 
worlds that are physically identical to ours, I will be referring to worlds where the 
negative facts obtaining in our world also obtain. 
Secondly, since materialism is a claim about the world as a whole, it is also 
committed to holding that all the facts about our world globally supervene on the physical 
facts. It need not be the case, for instance, that all the facts about our world locally 
supervene on the physical facts for materialism to be true.  Value does not locally 
supervene on the physical facts. As was mentioned above, two specific entities that are 
physically identical may differ with respect to value. But this does not raise problems for 
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materialism. Value might still turn out to supervene on the physical facts in their entirety. 
In this sense, value would globally supervene on the physical facts. And this is what 
materialism is committed to. 
Therefore, materialism is committed to the claim that all the facts about our world 
globally metaphysically supervene on the physical facts; that is to say, there is no 
metaphysically possible world that is identical to ours with respect to the physical facts 
and different from ours with respect to some other fact. 
 
III: Conceivability and Possibility 
Chalmers contends that one can establish that a world is metaphysically possible by 
establishing that it is conceivable. In particular, he argues that conceivability entails 
metaphysical possibility. He uses his framework of two-dimensional semantics to 
respond to two types of purported counterexamples. 
The first type concerns complex mathematical theorems. Some have suggested, 
for instance, that Goldbach’s conjecture can be conceived to be both true and false, but it 
is certainly not possible for it to be both.  Chalmers argues that the problem here comes 
from conflating two types of conceivability, prima facie and ideal.  Prima facie 
conceivability applies to something that a “subject is unable to rule out …by a priori 
reasoning, on initial consideration.”5  Ideal conceivability applies to something that 
“cannot be ruled out a priori, even on ideal rational reflection.”6  Chalmers argues that we 
have no reason to think that both the truth and falsity of Goldbach’s conjecture can be 
                                                
5 Chalmers 2005, sec. 2. 
6 Ibid. 
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ideally conceived of; and it is ideal conceivability that Chalmers is primarily concerned 
with. 
Chalmers further delineates the notions of negative and positive conceivability. 
Negative conceivability applies to something that cannot be ruled out by a priori 
reasoning.  Both prima facie and ideal conceivability can therefore be used to distinguish 
two types of negative conceivability. Positive conceivability, on the other hand, applies to 
something that can be “coherently imagine[d]… [It] involves being able to form some 
sort of clear and distinct conception of a situation in which the hypothesis is true.”7  Thus, 
the example of there being a flounder the size of Canada is positively conceivable; I have 
no trouble coherently imaging a situation in which this is true.  Accordingly, prima facie 
and ideal conceivability can also be seen as types of positive conceivability whenever 
they are applied to coherently imagined situations. 
So, regarding the link between conceivability and possibility, all that the 
Goldbach example demonstrates is that prima facie conceivability does not entail 
possibility. This does nothing, however, to damage the link between ideal (positive or 
negative) conceivability and possibility. Thus, from here on out I will follow Chalmers’ 
example in using “conceivability” to mean “ideal conceivability,” unless otherwise 
indicated. 
A second alleged counterexample to the link between conceivability and 
possibility comes from the notion of a posteriori necessity largely developed by Saul 
Kripke.  With Kripke’s work it has become widely held that certain necessary truths can 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
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only be known a posteriori. Consider, for instance, the identity relation between water 
and H2O.  Kripke argues that we first come to identify water “by its characteristic feel, 
appearance, and perhaps taste.”8  But once we discover by empirical investigation that 
water is H2O, we accept this to be a truth that holds by necessity (i.e., across every 
possible world).  Even if we found a substance that was like water in its feel, appearance, 
and taste, but had a different atomic structure, Kripke argues that we would not call this 
water. We would instead consider it a kind of “fool’s water; a substance which, though 
having the properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be 
water.”9  Kripke goes on to suggest that this “applies not only to the actual world but 
even when we talk about counterfactual situations.”10 
If Kripke is correct, then there is no metaphysically possible world in which water 
is not H2O.  This may cast doubt on the claim that conceivability entails metaphysical 
possibility. For we can at least conceive of a world in which water is not H2O.  And if 
Kripke is right that such a world is not metaphysically possible, then this appears to be an 
example of something that is conceivable yet not metaphysically possible. 
Chalmers argues, however, that when the details are examined such examples of a 
posteriori necessity do not in fact break the link between conceivability and metaphysical 
possibility but instead demonstrate that a notion can have a primary and secondary 
intension.  Primary and secondary intensions are to be understood as functions.11 The 
primary intension of a notion is a function that takes a centered world (i.e., a possible 
                                                
8 Kripke 1980, p. 128. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Chalmers and Jackson 2001, Chalmers 2006a, Chalmers 2006b. 
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world that is centered on an individual and a time) and maps it onto the notions’s 
extension. For example, let us take the notion “water.” Consider a scenario in which an 
individual is centered at a world where the life-sustaining liquid found in rivers, oceans, 
and lakes has an atomic structure other than H2O. When the term “water” is used by the 
individual centered at this world, its primary intension does not refer to H2O but to 
whatever atomic structure the liquid at this world has. But given that you are centered at a 
world where the life-sustaining liquid found in rivers, oceans, and lakes is H2O, it follows 
that the primary intension of your use of the term “water” does refer to H2O. Thus, the 
primary intension of a notion can pick out different referents in different centered worlds. 
The secondary intension of a notion, in turn, is a function from a possible world to 
the notion’s extension. Here we should ask: Given that “water” refers to H2O in our 
world, what does “water” refer to in other possible worlds?  Now, supposing that we 
grant the Kripkean intuition, the answer is that “water” picks out, in every possible world, 
whatever water is in our world. And since water is H2O in our world, the secondary 
intension of “water” picks out H2O in every possible world. 
With this distinction between primary and secondary intensions, Chalmers argues 
that the examples of a posteriori necessity pose no threat to the claim that conceivability 
entails metaphysical possibility. When we conceive of a world in which water is not H2O 
we are only conceiving of a world in which the primary intension of  “water” picks out 
something other than H2O.  Chalmers refers to this type of conceivability as 1-
conceivability. In this sense it is possible that ‘water is not H2O’; that is, there are 
centered worlds where the life-sustaining liquid found in rivers, oceans, and lakes is not 
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H2O. Chalmers labels this as 1-possibility.  Therefore, the statement ‘water is not H2O’ is 
both 1-conceivable and 1-possible. 
What is not metaphysically possible is for the secondary intension of “water” to 
refer to something other than H2O.  Since water is H2O in our world, the secondary 
intension of “water” will pick out H2O in every possible world. This raises no problem 
for the conceivability-possibility link, however. Given the Kripkean intuition that ‘water 
is H2O’ holds across every possible world, we cannot coherently conceive of a world in 
which the secondary intension of “water” picks out something other than H2O. Along 
these lines of secondary intensions, ‘water is not H2O’ is neither 2-possible nor 2-
conceivable. 
Therefore, according to Chalmers, examples of a posteriori necessity do not 
actually point to cases where something is conceivable yet not metaphysically possible. 
They merely point to cases where something is 1-conceivable and 1-possible, yet neither 
2-conceivable nor 2-possible.  And as Chalmers notes, “these cases are entirely 
compatible with a link between 2-conceivability and 2-possibility, and…with a link 
between 1-conceivability and 1-possibility.”12 
So, the two proposals for counterexamples given here (complex mathematical 
theorems and a posteriori necessity) only break the link between prima facie 
conceivability and possibility, and between 1-conceivability and 2-possibility.  But 
Chalmers argues that there has yet to be any counterexamples given that break the link 
between ideal (negative or positive) 1-conceivability and 1-possibility, or ideal positive 
                                                
12 Chalmers 2005, sec. 2. 
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2-conceivability and 2-possibility.13  Therefore, the relation between conceivability and 
possibility can still be formulated as such:                                
a) Ideal (negative or positive) 1-conceivability entails 1-possibility. 
b) Ideal positive 2-conceivability entails 2-possibility. 
 
The legitimacy of a) or b) would be undermined if a counterexample to either statement 
was given. But since this has not been done Chalmers argues that we have no available 
reason to doubt either statement. 
 
IV: Materialism, Conceivability, and Zombies 
Consider again the doctrine of materialism.  At the very least, materialism must be 
committed to the claim that all the facts about our world globally metaphysically 
supervene on the physical facts.  For, if there is a possible world physically identical to 
ours in which the negative facts obtaining in our world also obtain (see section II), and 
this world is different from ours with respect to some other fact, then this fact: 1) is not a 
physical fact (since this counterfactual world is physically identical to ours) and 2) holds 
in our world (since the all the negative facts obtaining in our world also obtain in this 
counterfactual world).  If this were the case, it would entail that there is a non-physical 
fact about our world, and hence materialism would be false. 
Furthermore, since materialism is concerned with the facts about our world as 
they actually are, then in Chalmers’ two-dimensional terminology, materialism is 
committed to the claim that it is not 2-possible for there to be a world that is identical to 
                                                
13 Since ideal 2-conceivability depends on empirical knowledge about our world, and 
since negative conceivability is purely an a priori matter, ideal 2-conceivability is always 
a type of positive conceivability. 
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ours with respect to the physical facts and different from ours with respect to some other 
fact. If it can be demonstrated that such a world is 2-possible, then this will refute 
orthodox materialism. 
Chalmers argues that the conceivability of zombies succeeds in demonstrating just 
this. To understand the details of the argument, consider two conceptions of the mind that 
Chalmers delineates: the psychological and the phenomenal.  He writes, 
On the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it feels; on the 
psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it does. There should be no 
question of competition between these two notions of mind. Neither of them is the 
correct analysis of mind.  They cover different phenomena, both of which are 
quite real.14 
 
Chalmers notes that, in making this distinction, he is not committing himself to any view 
about whether or not these notions might turn out to be the same thing.  All he is doing is 
making a conceptual distinction that he finds plausible. 
 There is a strong correlation that can be seen between the psychological and the 
phenomenal. Many of our mental states, for instance, will likely have both aspects.  And 
any time there is a phenomenal aspect to some mental state, there will also be an 
associated psychological aspect.15  For example, my desire for a cup of coffee has a 
phenomenal aspect to it in the sense that there is something it is like, or a certain way it 
feels, to desire a cup of coffee. It is these qualitative feels (or qualia) that constitute the 
phenomenal aspect of my desire. But my desire also has a psychological aspect to it in 
the sense that it can be understood to be the cause of certain actions (such as grinding 
coffee beans, retrieving water for my coffee maker, etcetera).  Again, whether or not 
                                                
14 Chalmers 1996, p. 11. 
15 Ibid., p. 22. 
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these two notions end up being the same thing is not crucial to Chalmers’ point, it is only 
crucial that we are able to have this conceptual distinction.16      
Now, what does Chalmers mean by the conceivability of a zombie? Consider an 
entity that is physically identical to me in every respect but lacks phenomenal experience.  
Following Chalmers, I will refer to this entity as my “zombie twin.”  This creature looks 
and acts just as I do; there is no sense in which it physically differs from me.  It only 
differs in that it lacks phenomenal experience. It is molecularly and behaviorally identical 
to me, but it has no sense of what it is like to experience something; as Chalmers puts it, 
it is “all dark inside.”17  With regards to the two notions of the mental, my zombie twin is 
psychologically identical to me but phenomenologically different; there is in fact no 
phenomenal aspect of my zombie twin’s mental states. 
To add vividness to the example, Chalmers gives the following illustration, 
…We can imagine that right now I am gazing out the window, experiencing some 
nice green sensations from seeing the trees outside, having pleasant taste 
experiences through munching on a chocolate bar, and feeling a dull aching 
sensation in my right shoulder.  What is going on in my zombie twin? …He will 
be processing the same sort of information, reacting in a similar way to inputs, 
with his internal configurations being modified appropriately and with 
indistinguishable behavior resulting…It is just that none of this functioning will 
be accompanied by any real conscious experience. There will be no phenomenal 
feel.18 
 
Chalmers maintains that such a creature is both ideally negatively 1-conceivable and 
ideally positively 1-conceivable; namely, that zombies cannot be ruled out a priori, and 
                                                
16 One might reject the intelligibility of this distinction and embrace eliminativism. 
Eliminativism roughly holds that there are no aspects of our mental states that can be 
accurately defined as phenomenal. Chalmers finds this view to be untenable and has 
argued against it  (see sec. 4, Type-A Materialism in Chalmers 2003a). 
17 Chalmers 1996, p. 96. 
18 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
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that one can coherently imagine zombies without any contradiction. Therefore, according 
to the framework of two-dimensional semantics, this entails that zombies are 1-possible. 
Now, if a world with zombies is 2-possible, then this raises problems for 
materialism.  For it entails that there is a world that is identical to ours with respect to the 
physical facts and different from ours with respect to some other facts (i.e., certain 
phenomenal facts about our world that would not be true in the physically identical 
zombie world).  Given this, Chalmers argues that the 1-possiblity of zombies is sufficient 
to place the materialist in a detrimental predicament. 
To see this, suppose that the primary and secondary intensions of physical terms 
are the same, and also suppose that the primary and secondary intensions of phenomenal 
terms are the same. If this were true, then the 1-possibility of zombies (i.e., there being a 
world, which is evaluated in terms of primary intensions, that is physically identical to 
ours but where my twin lacks phenomenal experience) would entail the 2-possibility of 
zombies.  Since the 2-possibility of zombies is problematic to materialism, the materialist 
will likely want to reject this identification of primary and secondary intensions. 
Chalmers argues, however, that the ways available to reject this identification will 
ultimately not help the materialist against his argument. 
Consider, first, how one might separate the primary and secondary intensions of 
physical terms. Regarding the notion of ‘mass,’ Chalmers writes, 
We might say that the primary intensions of ‘mass’ picks out whatever property 
plays the mass-role (e.g., resisting acceleration in certain ways, being subject to 
mutual attraction in a certain way, and so on)…[and] that the secondary 
intension…is tied to the property that actually plays the role.19 
                                                
19 Chalmers 2005, sec. 3. 
Myers, Blake Austin, 2008, UMSL, p. 18 
 
So here, the primary intensions pick out the structural properties of the physical world 
whereas the secondary intensions pick out the intrinsic properties of the physical world. 
Given this distinction, we can see that there are possible worlds that are physically 
identical to ours with respect to their structural properties but physically different from 
ours with respect to their intrinsic properties. For instance, there is a possible world 
where there is no intrinsic property of mass but where some other intrinsic property still 
plays the mass-role. And since the primary intensions pick out the structural properties 
and the secondary intension pick out the intrinsic properties, this is a 1-possible world 
that is physically identical to ours, but it is not a 2-possible world that is physically 
identical to ours. 
Along these lines, a materialist might want to claim that the 1-possibility of 
zombies does not entail that they are 2-possible.  The 1-possibility of a zombie-world 
only establishes that there is a world that is physically identical to ours with respect to its 
structural properties but without phenomenal experience. This still leaves the question 
open as to whether there is a possible world that is physically identical to ours with 
respect to its structural and intrinsic properties and yet without phenomenal experience. 
The materialist might in fact hold that phenomenal experience is determined by both the 
structural and intrinsic physical properties; for, if this were the case, then zombies would 
not be 2-possible. Chalmers labels this type of view as “Russellian monism.”  He writes, 
On this view, consciousness is closely tied to the intrinsic properties that serve as 
the categorical bases of microphysical dispositions. Russell and others held that 
the nature of these properties is not revealed to us by perception (which reveals 
only their effects) or by science (which reveals only their relations). But it is 
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coherent to suppose that these properties have a special nature that is tied to 
consciousness. 20 
 
He acknowledges that this view could suffice as a form of materialism, but he does not 
think that it will ultimately help to defend orthodox materialism.  For, according to 
Chalmers, a view that postulates that the character of phenomenal properties somehow 
lies in a special nature had by the intrinsic properties, is a view that has more in common 
with property dualism than it does with orthodox materialism. 
What then about differentiating the primary and secondary intentions of 
phenomenal terms?  According to Chalmers, this too will fail to shield materialism from 
his argument.  Since the orthodox materialist will want to reject Russellian monism, she 
will be committed to the claim that physical terms have the same primary and secondary 
intensions. Given this, differentiating the primary and secondary intensions of 
phenomenal terms will be of no help. For, even if only the primary intensions of the 
phenomenal terms applied to the conceivability of zombies, this would still indicate that 
there is a world identical to ours with respect to the physical facts and different from ours 
with respect to some other fact. For example, consider the above illustration in which 
Chalmers is looking out the window.  Here, the primary intensions of the phenomenal 
terms (green sensation, pleasant taste, dull aching sensation) apply to Chalmers’ mental 
states, but they do not apply to the mental states of Chalmers’ zombie-twin. Now, 
supposing that the physical terms have the same primary and secondary intensions, there 
is a possible world that is identical to ours with respect to the physical facts and different 
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from ours with respect to some other fact (the fact concerning whether or not a certain 
primary intension of a phenomenal term applies in a given case). 
 So, according to Chalmers, the 1-conceivability of zombies places the materialist 
in an uncomfortable dilemma. It forces the materialist to either give up materialism 
altogether by acknowledging that there is a possible world that is identical to ours with 
respect to the physical facts and different from ours with respect to some other fact, or to 
give up orthodox materialism and adopt some sort of Russellian monism. 
 
V: Are Zombies Conceivable? 
Now, Chalmers’ argument can only succeed if zombies are indeed ideally positively 1-
conceivable or ideally negatively 1-conceivable. If zombies do not fall under at least one 
of these types of conceivability, Chalmers’ argument fails.  Let us begin with the former 
conceivability type.  Are zombies ideally positively 1-conceivable?  That is, can we 
imagine a scenario with a zombie where no contradiction enters even after ideal rational 
reflection? I submit that we cannot. The problem is that phenomenal experience (i.e., the 
qualitative feel/what-it-is-likeness of experience) is not something we can imagine; it is 
only something we can have. All we ever imagine is the pure representational content 
(that is, the object represented in a mental state), and in doing so we have a new 
phenomenal experience of the imagined content.21 
                                                
21 A note on terminology: Chalmers distinguishes perceptual imagination from modal 
imagination. The former involves forming a perceptual mental image of a situation (e.g., 
Santa flying in a sleigh), whereas the latter can involve a situation “beyond the scale of 
perception: e.g. molecules of H2O, or Germany winning the Second World War” 
(Chalmers 2002a, p. 151). I follow Alex Byrne (2007) here and take this distinction to be 
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 Consider the following scenario. Suppose that you are currently looking at a red 
cup that is sitting on a desk in front of you and are thereby having a phenomenal 
experience of this red cup.  Now, suppose you grab the cup and fling it out of a window 
next to you, thereby ceasing to have any phenomenal experience of the red cup.  What 
now are you able to imagine?  You can certainly imagine the red cup, even though you 
are no longer seeing it; and you can imagine sitting in the same position you were in 
while looking at the red cup. You can also imagine certain objects and words that you 
happened to be thinking about while looking at the red cup. But you cannot imagine the 
past phenomenal experience of the red cup (the qualitative feel/what-it-is-likeness of the 
experience).  The difficulty is that when you try to imagine the past phenomenal 
experience of the red cup you inevitably imagine the red cup itself.  And in imagining the 
red cup you merely have a new phenomenal experience.  Since this new phenomenal 
experience results from imagining the cup, rather than from previously perceiving the 
cup, it will be a different phenomenal experience.  The past phenomenal experience is not 
something you can imagine now. You can only have a similar phenomenal experience by 
imagining the representational content (i.e., the red cup). 
The same line of reasoning is applicable to any phenomenal experience.  Suppose 
that you are in a state of excruciating pain (e.g., birth pangs, cancer pain, etcetera). Now 
suppose this pain eventually ceases. What now can you imagine regarding the pain?  You 
can imagine what you were doing while the pain was occurring as well as any behavioral 
                                                                                                                                            
a matter of degree, not of kind. When we imagine Germany’s victory, for instance, we 
still form some sort of perceptual mental image; it is only that the image is vague or 
partial. Therefore, I will use “imagine” broadly to mean form a perceptual mental image 
of (even if only vague or partial). 
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responses that the pain brought about. You can also imagine the thoughts you were 
having while in pain. But you cannot imagine the past phenomenal experience of the 
pain. When you attempt to imagine the past phenomenal experience of the pain, you 
inevitably imagine certain representational contents. These contents may include 
screaming, sweating, clenching your fists, thinking about how long the pain will last, 
etcetera. And as you imagine such contents, you will likely have vivid (and even 
disturbing) phenomenal experiences of the imagined contents. You might, for instance, 
feel a mixture of distressing emotions intertwined with a phenomenal awareness of the 
areas of your body in which you had the pain. Or you may even have a new phenomenal 
experience of pain itself.  But just as in the red cup example, any such phenomenal 
experience will be distinct from the experience of the pain you had before.  And the 
phenomenal experience of the prior pain is not in itself something you can imagine. You 
can only have a similar phenomenal experience as you imagine certain representational 
contents.22 
 
5.1 The Problem with the Positive Conceivability of Zombies 
Let us now inquire into the impact my argument has on the positive conceivability of 
zombies.  Suppose that there are two creatures physically identical to you, one lacks 
phenomenal experience (call this creature A) and one has phenomenal experience (call 
this creature B).  What can you imagine regarding these creatures?  Well given my 
argument you can only imagine certain representational contents; namely, the physical 
                                                
22 As can be seen, the evidential basis for my argument comes primarily through 
introspection. In future work, I hope to more fully examine the relationship between 
imagination and introspective reports. 
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properties of A and B and the objects within their surroundings. You cannot, however, 
imagine A’s or B’s phenomenal experience.  Hence, you cannot imagine any of the 
phenomenal states of A or B. But since the only difference between A and B is a 
difference in their phenomenal states, it follows that both A and B are identical in their 
imagined form. This leads us to my key point: In imagining one of your physically 
identical twins you have no way to determine whether you are imagining A (your zombie 
twin) or B (your phenomenally conscious twin). Thus you have no way to determine 
whether you are actually imagining a zombie. 
This has significant consequences. In particular, it shows that your ability to 
imagine a creature that “lacks” phenomenal experience does not establish that you can 
imagine a zombie. Any creature you imagine will be imagined without imagining 
phenomenal experience. So imagining a creature that “lacks” phenomenal experience 
does not differentiate this creature from a non-zombie. This is problematic for the claim 
that zombies are ideally positively 1-conceivable. Without being able to differentiate 
zombies from non-zombies in imagined scenarios, you have no basis for claiming that 
“upon a priori reflection you can clearly and distinctly imagine a scenario with a 
zombie.” Therefore, you have no basis for claiming that zombies are ideally positively 1-
conceivable. 23 
                                                
23 The question is still left open as to whether we might be able to imagine phenomenal 
experience sometime in the future.  It might be asked, for instance, “Is it possible that 
certain scientific, philosophical, or conceptual developments will arise that would enable 
us to imagine phenomenal experience? And if such developments did arise, would that 
enable us to imagine zombies?” Presently, I am noncommittal with respect to these 
questions. But they are, indeed, important to consider. And I plan to address them in 
subsequent work. 
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VI. Potential Objections 
Let us now turn to consider some potential objections to my argument. 
 
1) First, it may be objected that, even if we cannot imagine someone without phenomenal 
experience, we can still imagine that there is someone without phenomenal experience. 
This objection relates to a distinction between two different views about experiential 
content. First, experiential content might involve both an object that is experienced and 
the properties of the experienced object. On this view, experiential content is object-
involving content. Second, experiential content might merely involve the content that 
there is some object that has such-and-such properties. On this view, experiential content 
is existentially quantified content.24  
Now, consider how this distinction might parallel a distinction between two types 
of imagination. Think, for instance, about imagining the red cup. When you imagine the 
red cup, you might, on the one hand, imagine the red cup as an object-involving 
content—that is, you might imagine the actual object, as well as the object’s properties 
(‘being red,’ ‘being a cup,’ etcetera). On the other hand, you might merely imagine the 
red cup as an existentially quantified content—that is, you might only imagine that there 
is some object that has the properties ‘being red,’ ‘being a cup,’ and so forth.  
Given these two types of imagination, the above objection could be put as 
follows: Even if we cannot imagine a zombie as an object-involving content, we can still 
                                                
24 For more on this distinction see Susanna Siegel 2006. 
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imagine a zombie as an existentially quantified content. And this may be enough to 
warrant the claim that zombies are positively conceivable. 
I argue, however, that we have no basis to think that we can imagine such a 
scenario. My reason is similar to the argument given in the previous section. Given that 
you cannot imagine phenomenal experience, you cannot determine whether you are 
actually imagining your zombie twin (as opposed to your phenomenally conscious twin) 
as an existentially quantified content. To see the difficulty, consider one of the 
differences between imagining a red cup as an existentially quantified content and 
imagining a phenomenally conscious creature as an existentially quantified content. 
When you imagine that there is a red cup, you are able to imagine all of the object’s 
properties (the only thing you cannot imagine is the object itself). So, if you wanted to 
determine that you are imagining that there is a red cup that also has the property 
‘shininess,’ you could imagine a shiny finish in conjunction with the other properties. But 
unlike imagining a shiny finish, you cannot imagine phenomenal experience. Thus, in 
order to determine that you are imagining that there is a creature that has phenomenal 
properties, you cannot imagine phenomenal experience in conjunction with other 
properties.  
So how can you determine that you are imagining that there is a phenomenally 
conscious creature? I see no way to answer this question. And the lack of an answer 
raises a problem that parallels the one mentioned in the previous section. In particular, if 
you cannot determine that you are imagining that there is a phenomenally conscious 
creature, then how can you distinguish imagining this from imagining that there is a 
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zombie? Unless you have a way to differentiate these imagined scenarios, you have no 
reason to think that you can ever actually imagine a zombie (as opposed to a 
phenomenally conscious creature) as an existentially quantified content. 
 
2) Second, it might be objected that, given our ability to feel empathy for other creatures, 
it seems as if we can imagine phenomenal experience.  I would respond, however, that 
these feelings of empathy should not be confused with actually imagining another 
creature’s phenomenal experience. Suppose you see some creature that appears to be in 
pain. What is it that you imagine when feeling empathy for this creature?  You likely 
imagine certain representational contents that you suppose the creature to be responding 
to.  And by imagining these contents two things occur: 1) You have a phenomenal 
experience of the imagined contents; and 2) You begin to feel certain emotions being 
directed towards this other creature (excitement for it, gladness for it, sadness for it, 
etcetera).  But nothing in this process indicates that you ever imagine the other creature’s 
phenomenal experience. You merely imagine certain contents and thereby have certain 
phenomenal experiences within yourself (including your phenomenal experience of the 
contents, as well as your phenomenal experience of the emotions that are directed 
towards the other creature). 
 
3) Third, one might object that we can at least imagine what a past experience felt like. 
And this may suggest that we are able to imagine certain phenomenal qualities. Strictly 
speaking, however, we cannot imagine what a past experience felt like. To see this let us 
consider the phrase, “what a past experience felt like.” This phrase can be interpreted in 
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two ways. On the one hand, it might refer to some inner experience (e.g., pain, pleasure, 
excitement). Under this interpretation, the objection is dealt with in the third paragraph of 
section V where I talk about pain. 
On the other hand, it might refer to the what-it-is-likeness of an experience. Given 
this interpretation, we can consider again the red cup example. When you attempt to 
imagine what the past experience of perceiving the red cup felt like two things occur: 1) 
You imagine the representational contents (the red cup, its surroundings, etcetera); and 2) 
You feel what it is like to experience the imagined contents. Thus, there is no imagining 
that pertains to what the past experience felt like. The imagining pertains to the contents, 
and the feelings pertain to the current experience of the imagined contents. 
 
4) Fourth, one might object that there is a difference between imagining two different 
representational contents (e.g., a green fire hydrant and a red fire hydrant) and imagining 
that something that looks green to me looks red to someone else. This difference may be 
used to suggest that I imagine phenomenal experience in the latter case but not the 
former.25 I would respond, however, that when the details are examined no appeal to 
imagining phenomenal experience is warranted. 
I agree that imagining two different representational contents is different from 
imagining that something that looks green to me looks red to someone else; but this raises 
no problems for my argument. The difference can be accounted for in the following way: 
1) Suppose I imagine two different representational contents (e.g., a green fire 
hydrant and a red fire hydrant). I might do so in one of the following manners: 
                                                
25 An objection along these lines was raised to me by David Chalmers (personal 
correspondence). 
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a) I imagine two separate objects, a green fire hydrant and a red fire 
hydrant. And by imagining these two objects I have certain phenomenal 
experiences of both imagined objects. 
 
b) I imagine one green object (e.g., a green fire hydrant) and then I 
imagine this same object as red. By doing this I first have a phenomenal 
experience of the imagined green object, and then I have a phenomenal 
experience of the imagined object as red. 
 
2) Now, suppose I imagine that something that looks green to me looks red to 
you. Here I first imagine a green object (and thereby have a phenomenal 
experience of this imagined green object). Then as I imagine you to be looking at 
this object I imagine the object to be red (and thereby have a phenomenal 
experience of both an imagined red object and of my imagined conception of you 
looking at the object). I do not, however, imagine your phenomenal experience of 
the object. I merely have my own phenomenal experience of the imagined 
contents, namely you and the object. 
 
So, in 1a) I simultaneously imagine two different objects and thereby simultaneously 
have phenomenal experiences of both imagined objects. In 1b) I first imagine a green 
object (and thereby have a phenomenal experience of this imagined green object) and 
then I imagine the object as red (and thereby have a phenomenal experience of this 
imagined red object). In 2) I also begin by imagining a green object (and thereby having a 
phenomenal experience of this imagined green object). But then I proceed to imagine 
both the object as red as well as your visual relation to this object (and thereby have a 
phenomenal experience of both an imagined red object and my imagined conception of 
you looking at the object). 
  Thus, I agree that imagining two different representational contents is different 
from imagining that something that looks red to me looks green to someone else. But the 
difference need not be accounted for by appealing to the claim that I imagine phenomenal 
experience.  Rather, the explanation can be given by appealing to the different contents 
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that I imagine and the different phenomenal experiences that I have, as well as the order 
and timing of imagining these contents and having these experiences.  Therefore, this 
does not serve as an objection to my position. 
 
5) Fifth, one might assume that my argument entails that we cannot attend to phenomenal 
experience itself.  This position is known as transparency. Transparency is a 
controversial position; and if my argument entails it, one could object to my argument 
merely by objecting to transparency. Upon examination, however, I think it can be shown 
that my argument does not entail transparency. Let us consider the details. 
Gilbert Harman, arguing for transparency, writes, 
When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic features of 
your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features 
of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to 
turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree, including relational 
features of the tree “from here.”26 
 
According to Harman we are unable to attend to the experience itself.  We can attend 
only to the object that the experience presents. The experience itself is transparent. 
Amy Kind makes a helpful distinction between weak and strong transparency. 
Weak transparency is the thesis that “it is difficult (but not impossible) to attend directly 
to our experience” whereas strong transparency is the thesis that “it is impossible to 
attend directly to our experience.”27 
Concerning the former, we can consider an argument put forth by Brian Loar 
(2002).  Loar maintains that we are unaware of the intrinsic properties of our experience 
                                                
26 Harman 1990, p. 667. 
27 Kind 2003, p. 7. 
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on most occasions.  He argues, however, that we can become aware of such properties by 
invoking certain thought experiments.  He invites us to consider a hallucination of a 
lemon that is phenomenally identical to a veridical visual experience of a lemon. He asks 
how we would recognize the “phenomenal sameness” of these two experiences.  We 
would do so, he answers, by attending to “how the two visual experiences present their 
apparent objects.”28 The experiences are directed at different objects. The hallucination is 
directed at a “merely-intentional object,” which does not exist, whereas the veridical 
experience is directed at an actual object, the existing lemon. But the experiences present 
their objects in an identical manner.  There is nothing in the presentations that could help 
us distinguish one from the other.  And given that we realize that the objects of the two 
experiences differ from each other, Loar concludes that our awareness that the 
presentations are indistinguishable must be an awareness of the intrinsic properties of the 
experiences. 
Strong transparency, on the other hand, states that we can never attend to features 
of experience itself.  Michael Tye, for instance, argues that when we attend to any type of 
experience (visual, auditory, bodily, veridical, hallucinatory, etcetera) we attend only to 
the surface qualities of the content.29 Experience is always transparent. 
Given these distinctions, let us consider what differentiates my conclusion from 
such claims. I have argued that phenomenal experience is not something we can imagine. 
But I have not committed myself to the claim that we are unable to attend to the intrinsic 
properties of experience, or even that it is difficult to do so. All my argument entails is 
                                                
28 Loar 2002, p. 7. 
29 See Tye 2002. 
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that we cannot attend to such properties by imagining experience. One could accept my 
argument, however, and hold that we can attend to such properties without imagining 
experience. For instance, one might argue that we can attend to the intrinsic properties of 
an occurrent experience. In an occurrent experience all the experiential properties are 
present. Nothing needs to be imagined in order to attend to them. A position along these 
lines is compatible with my argument, and furthermore, it rules out transparency. This 
shows that my argument does not entail transparency. So objections to transparency will 
not serve as objections to my position. 
 
VII: Clarifying Remarks 
I would like to point out some differences between my argument and three prominent 
objections to the zombie conceivability argument. 
 
1) Eric Marcus argues that zombies are not positively conceivable.  He maintains that, to 
positively conceive of a zombie, one needs to imagine the absence of phenomenal 
experience. But this requires imagining subjective absence, the absence of what-it-is-like 
to be something. And Marcus argues that this is impossible.  He writes, 
Imagining subjective absence presents an insurmountable obstacle. On the one 
hand, it is something that we are to imagine from the first-person point of 
view…It is supposed to be a subjective fact about zombies that they lack 
consciousness.  On the other hand, there is nothing that it’s like to be subjectively 
absent. So there is no imagining of the what-it’s-like variety that we can use to 
arrive at this possibility. 30 
 
                                                
30 Marcus 2004, p.10. 
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Chalmers directly objects to this line of thought. He writes, “There is no more problem 
with clearly and distinctly imagining a situation in which there is no consciousness than 
in imagining a world in which there are no angels.” 31  So here we are left with opposing 
claims concerning whether or not we can imagine the absence of phenomenal experience. 
Chalmers does, however, raise a second objection: 
One should keep in mind that for the anti-materialist argument, one does not need 
to consider beings as remote from us as zombies, or even as remote as full-scale 
inverts. It suffices if we can conceive of a being whose conscious experience is 
for just a moment slightly different from that of an actual physical duplicate's: 
perhaps they experience a slightly different shade at a point in the background of 
their visual field. Any problems that are specific to zombies then will not apply.32 
  
Thus, even if it is not accepted that we can imagine the absence of phenomenal 
experience, Chalmers can still rephrase the argument so that we are imagining creatures 
with different phenomenal experiences rather than no phenomenal experiences.  But since 
my argument deals with our inability to imagine phenomenal experience, this particular 
response will be of no help.  For without the ability to imagine phenomenal experience, 
we will not be able to imagine two physically identical creatures that have differing 
phenomenal experiences. This indicates that my argument will also have implications for 
other conceivability arguments that appeal to phenomenal experience (e.g., inverted 
spectrum).  To show this in detail would be a useful project for the future. 
 
2) Robert Van Gulick (1999) contends that the conceivability of zombies is a result of the 
inadequacy of our current physical and phenomenal concepts.  He suggests that, with 
                                                
31 Chalmers 2005, sec. 4.6. 
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further advances in science, new conceptions may well develop that will render zombies 
inconceivable. 
Chalmers responds, 
 
To render zombies incoherent even on ideal reflection requires some sort of 
conceptual link between physical and phenomenal concepts. Given that physics and 
physical concepts are all structural-dynamical in character…phenomenal concepts 
must have a character that is linked to structural-dynamic concepts in an appropriate 
way. Upon examination, the only candidate that is remotely tenable is the hypothesis 
that phenomenal concepts are functional concepts. But [as seen in Chalmers 2003a] 
there is good reason to reject that view.33 
 
This debate seems prone to reach a stalemate, getting stuck in a cycle of 
affirmation and denial concerning whether phenomenal concepts could ever be 
understood as functional concepts.  My argument, however, differs from van Gulick’s.  I 
argue that even under our current concepts we have no basis to claim that we are 
positively conceiving of a zombie. Without being able to imagine phenomenal 
experience, an imagined creature that is physically identical to us (with respect to an 
underdeveloped conception of the physical) and supposedly lacks phenomenal experience 
will be indistinguishable from an imagined creature that is physically identical to us (with 
respect to an underdeveloped conception of the physical) and supposedly has 
phenomenal experience.  Thus we have no reason to think that the creature is a zombie. 
 
3) Daniel Stoljar (2001) suggests that there are two ways to understand the physical. 
First, there is the “theory-based” conception of the physical. Under this conception, 
physical properties are understood to be the properties described in physical theory. 
Second, there is the “object-based” conception of the physical. Under this conception, 
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physical properties are understood to be the intrinsic properties of physical objects. 
Stoljar argues that when we conceive of a zombie we are only conceiving of a creature 
that is identical to us with respect to the properties in physical theory. But it may not be 
the case that such a creature is identical to us with respect to its intrinsic physical 
properties. So there is no guarantee that zombies are really physically identical to us. 
According to my argument, however, we have no reason to think that we can 
positively conceive of a zombie under the theory-based conception of the physical.  
Given that we cannot imagine phenomenal experience, an imagined creature that is 
identical to us with respect to the properties in physical theory, and lacks phenomenal 
experience, will remain indistinguishable from an imagined creature that is identical to us 
with respect to the properties in physical theory, and has phenomenal experience. 
Therefore, we have no basis for claiming that we can ideally positively 1-conceive of a 
zombie. 
 
VIII: The Negative Conceivability of Zombies 
Thus far my argument has focused on our inability to imagine phenomenal experience 
and the problem this creates for claiming that we can positively conceive of a zombie.  
Chalmers maintains, however, that the ideal negative 1-conceivability of zombies is 
sufficient for his argument. To examine this claim I would like to consider an argument 
put forth by Keith Frankish (2007) that invokes the notion of anti-zombies. 
Anti-zombies are creatures that are physically identical to us, with no non-
physical properties, and yet they have phenomenal experience. Frankish argues that one 
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can use the same method employed in the zombie argument and run a parallel argument 
that goes from the conceivability of an anti-zombie, to the possibility of an anti-zombie, 
to the truth of materialism. The argument is roughly as follows: P1) A purely physical 
creature with phenomenal experience is conceivable; P2) Conceivability entails 
possibility; P3) If a purely physical creature with phenomenal experience is possible, then 
phenomenal properties are physical properties; C1) Phenomenal properties are physical 
properties; C2) Every creature that is physically identical to us is also 
phenomenologically identical to us (i.e., there are no zombies in any world).34 
Given C2), zombies and anti-zombies cannot both be possible. And, given the 
conceivability-possibility thesis, zombies and anti-zombies cannot both be ideally 
conceivable. How then is one to decide which creature is ideally conceivable? The 
zombie advocate cannot simply rule out the ideal conceivability of anti-zombies by 
arguing that zombies are ideally conceivable. As Frankish aptly notes, “The problem with 
this tactic...is that it simply pits one conceivability intuition against another. The advocate 
of the anti-zombie argument can run an exactly parallel argument for the view that 
zombies are not ideally conceivable."35 The zombie advocate needs to give some 
independent reason as to why we should think that zombies (rather than anti-zombies) are 
ideally conceivable. Now, this might be done by arguing that anti-zombies resist 
imagination in a way that zombies do not. Frankish anticipates this response. He writes, 
It is true that there is some imaginative resistance to the idea that consciousness 
might be physical. ‘How could this’, people sometimes ask, mentally indicating 
some experience, ‘be just a neurological state?’ Difficulty is irrelevant here, 
                                                
34 A similar argument has also been put forth by Gualtiero Piccinini (ms). 
35 Frankish 2007, p. 14. 
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however. Conceivability is all or nothing, and one state of affairs may be harder to 
imagine than another without being less conceivable.36 
 
I suspect, however, that this response will not satisfy the zombie advocate. A question 
such as, “How could this be just a neurological state?”, is not used to indicate that it is 
merely difficult to imagine phenomenal experience to be physical. Rather, it is used to 
suggest that we are currently unable to imagine phenomenal experience to be physical 
(e.g., Levine 1983, 1993, McGinn 1991). Given this, it will most likely be argued that we 
are unable to imagine (positively conceive of) anti-zombies. And if the positive 
conceivability of zombies is granted, then the zombie advocate will have an advantage 
over the anti-zombie argument. 
 For this reason, my argument is useful to the anti-zombie argument. Given that 
we cannot imagine phenomenal experience, we have no justification for claiming that 
either zombies or anti-zombies are positively conceivable. Thus, we are left only with the 
negative conceivability of zombies and anti-zombies. And, as mentioned above, one 
cannot rule out the ideal negative 1-conceivability of one creature by merely stating that 
the other creature is ideally negatively 1-conceivable. Some independent reason needs to 
be given as to why the ideal negative 1-conceivability of one creature is more plausible 
than that of the other creature. And until this is done, we have no basis for claiming that 
zombies (rather than anti-zombies) are ideally negatively 1-conceivable. 
Without being able to use either the ideal positive 1-conceivability of zombies or 
the ideal negative 1-conceivability of zombies as a guide to possibility, Chalmers’ 
argument fails to refute orthodox materialism. 
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IX: Conclusion 
 
To summarize, I have argued that we have no basis for claiming that zombies are ideally 
positively 1-conceivable or ideally negatively 1-conceivable.  Regarding the former, I 
argued that phenomenal experience is not something we can imagine; it is only 
something we can have. We can only imagine the contents of an experience, and in doing 
so we have a new phenomenal experience of the imagined contents.  My position does 
not entail that it is impossible (or even difficult) to attend directly to phenomenal 
experience itself, but only that we cannot do so by imagining it. 
Next, I considered the impact my argument has on the positive conceivability of 
zombies. I argued that without being able to imagine phenomenal experience we have no 
way of knowing whether a creature that we imagine has or lacks phenomenal experience. 
Therefore, we have no basis for claiming that we can ideally positively 1-conceive of a 
zombie. 
Regarding the ideal negative 1-conceivability of zombies, I deferred to an 
argument given by Keith Frankish that invokes the idea of anti-zombies (creatures that 
are physically identical to us, with no non-physical properties, and yet have phenomenal 
experience). Frankish argues that one can use the same method employed in the zombie 
argument and run a parallel argument that goes from the conceivability of an anti-zombie, 
to the possibility of an anti-zombie, to the truth of materialism. I argued that, without the 
positively conceivability of zombies, we have no basis for claiming that zombies (rather 
than anti-zombies) are ideally negatively 1-conceivable. 
Myers, Blake Austin, 2008, UMSL, p. 38 
In conclusion, Chalmers has failed to demonstrate that zombies are ideally 
positively 1-conceivable or ideally negatively 1-conceivable. Therefore, his argument 
fails to refute orthodox materialism. 
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